cvelistv5

Lazy web why did it take 2 weeks for people to care about github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/commits/main/cves… ?

Lazy web why did it take 2 weeks for people to care about github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/commits/main/cves… ?

CVE-2026-116582: CVE-2026-116582: Cross-Site Scripting via Unescaped RegExp Serialization in Seroval CVE-2026-116582: Cross-Site Scripting via Unescaped RegExp Serialization in Seroval > Vulnerability ID: CVE-2026-116582 > CVSS Score: 4.7 > Published: 2026-10-28 CVE-2026-116582 is an improper output escaping vulnerability in the Seroval JavaScript serialization library that leads to cross-site scripting (XSS). When Seroval serializes RegExp objects into executable JavaScript literals for embedding in HTML script elements, it fails to neutralize the less-than character ('<'). If an application constructs a regular expression from untrusted input and embeds the serialized output inside an inline script block during server-side rendering (SSR), an attacker can inject a closing script tag to break out of the JavaScript context and execute arbitrary client-side code. TL;DR Seroval versions prior to 1.0.0 and from 1.5.5 to 1.6.9 fail to escape '<' characters when serializing RegExp objects into JavaScript literals. Embedding serialized untrusted RegExp objects into HTML <script> blocks enables cross-site scripting (XSS). Upgrade to Seroval 1.6.10 to remediate the flaw. --- ⚠️ Exploit Status: POC Technical Details - CVE ID: CVE-2026-116582 (GHSA-9wx9-5pv9-3349) - Weakness Class: CWE-79 (Cross-Site Scripting) / CWE-116 (Improper Output Escaping) - CVSS v3.1 Score: 4.7 Medium (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N) - EPSS Score: 0.19% (8.36th Percentile) - Attack Vector: Network (SSR HTML <script> Breakout via RegExp Literal) - Affected Versions: seroval < 1.0.0 and >= 1.5.5, < 1.6.10 - Patched Version: seroval 1.6.10 - CISA KEV Status: Not Listed Affected Systems - seroval - seroval-plugins - seroval: < 1.0.0 (Fixed in: 1.6.10) - seroval: >= 1.5.5, < 1.6.10 (Fixed in: 1.6.10) - seroval-plugins: < 1.0.0 (Fixed in: 1.6.10) - seroval-plugins: >= 1.5.5, < 1.6.10 (Fixed in: 1.6.10) Code Analysis Commit: f94ee0b fix: keep RegExp sources from closing the script element --- a/packages/seroval/src/core/context/serializer.ts +++ b/packages/seroval/src/core/context/serializer.ts @@ -879,6 +879,13 @@ function serializeRegExp( node: SerovalRegExpNode, ): string { if (ctx.base.features & Feature.RegExp) { + // A literal would put the source's `<` back into the output, so `</script>` + // could close the page's script element. Escaping it inside a literal + // breaks named groups and lookbehinds, so the escaped source goes through + // the constructor instead. + if (node.c.includes('\\x3C')) { + return 'new RegExp("' + node.c + '","' + node.m + '")'; + } return '/' + deserializeString(node.c) + '/' + node.m; } throw new SerovalUnsupportedNodeError(node); Mitigation Strategies - Upgrade the seroval package to version 1.6.10 or higher across all direct and transitive dependencies. - Serialize user-supplied search or filter patterns as plain strings during SSR hydration and construct RegExp objects on the client side after deserialization. - Implement a nonce-based Content Security Policy (CSP) without 'unsafe-inline' to prevent unauthorized inline <script> blocks from executing if script breakout occurs. - Validate and reject untrusted regular expression patterns containing the '<' character before server-side instantiation. Remediation Steps: 1. Audit application lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock) using 'npm ls seroval' to identify versions < 1.0.0 or >= 1.5.5, < 1.6.10. 2. Run 'npm install seroval@^1.6.10' (or apply package.json overrides/resolutions for transitive dependencies) to install the patched release. 3. Verify that serialized RegExp outputs containing '<' are now emitted as 'new RegExp("...\x3C...", "flags")' rather than literal '/.../' expressions. 4. Redeploy the server-side rendering application and verify CSP headers are enforced on HTML responses. References - GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-9wx9-5pv9-3349 - Patch Commit: fix: keep RegExp sources from closing the script element - GitHub Release: seroval@1.6.10 - National Vulnerability Database (NVD) - CVE-2026-116582 - CVE Project cvelistV5 Record - CVE-2026-116582 - CVE.org Official Record - CVE-2026-116582 --- Read the full report for CVE-2026-116582 on our website for more details including interactive diagrams and full exploit analysis.

Remote Connect: Why We Require Up-To-Date Software 27. October 2026 Remote Connect, the free remote access service, will require Miniserver version 17.2.10.21 or later from 1 December 2026. Why up-to-date software matters today and how the switch works. Remote Connect is LOXONE's free service for remote access to the Miniserver. From 1 December 2026, Remote Connect will require the current Miniserver version, with 4 weeks for each new update. What is Remote Connect? Remote Connect works like a phone book: the Miniserver continuously registers with Remote Connect. When the LOXONE App wants to connect remotely, it asks Remote Connect where the Miniserver can be reached. Remote Connect brokers the connection, and the App and Miniserver then communicate in encrypted form via a tunnel. User and access data remain on the Miniserver. No port forwarding or technical setup is required. Remote Connect is one of three ways to access the Miniserver from outside: * Remote Connect: LOXONE's free service, with no port forwarding and no technical setup. * Manual external access: via port forwarding on the router (loxone.com)). * VPN: via a dedicated VPN into the local network. Responsibility as an Intermediary Anyone who brokers connections to homes and buildings carries responsibility, even with a free service. The cyberattack on LOXONE showed us that security does not end with our own systems. The Miniserver architecture provides the best basis for this: local user and access data, no central point of attack. Remote Connect was not affected by the attack either. To keep it that way, Remote Connect will require the latest Miniserver version in future. What Changes From 1 December 2026 * From 1 Dec 2026, the free Remote Connect service requires Miniserver version [17.2.10.21] * From then on, the following applies in general: once a new Miniserver version is released, there are 4 weeks to install the update. Remote Connect then requires this version. * For older versions, Remote Connect will no longer broker connections. * Nothing changes on the local network. * Remote Connect remains free of charge. In the Age of AI, Up-To-Date Software Counts With AI, security vulnerabilities are found faster than ever before and exploited almost immediately. The number of security vulnerabilities (CVEs) reported worldwide is rising exponentially: in September 2025, 4,319 new vulnerabilities were published in a single month, in September 2026 it was already 14,934. Newly published security vulnerabilities (CVEs) per month, 2000 to September 2026. Data: CVE Program (cvelistV5), analysed via cve.0xosprey.com, as of 22 Oct 2026. And the time until an attack is getting shorter: for almost 30% of actively exploited vulnerabilities, the attack began on the day of disclosure or even earlier. Updating only when a new feature is wanted is therefore no longer enough. Devices must be operated with all current security updates at all times. This does not only apply to LOXONE: this development will affect the entire industry and far beyond. Regardless of Remote Connect, LOXONE therefore recommends keeping every installation up to date. New versions bring not only security updates but always significant new features as well. And free of charge: even Miniservers purchased in 2009 still receive free updates today. How to Switch Over The update is carried out as usual in LOXONE Config or in the LOXONE App: [Guide: Performing a Miniserver update](loxone.com). When a new update is available, the LOXONE App displays it, and the update can be carried out at the push of a button. The switch involves effort, especially for LOXONE Partners with many installations. That is why the requirement only applies from 1 December, and even after that there are 4 weeks for each new update. LOXONE Support is happy to help with any questions. We are also already working on ways to make updates even easier to carry out. My Home, My Data, My Decision Everyone can decide for themselves. If an installation is deliberately to remain on an older version, remote access can still be set up with a separate solution, for example via a VPN or manual external access (loxone.com). We are taking this step earlier than others, and we are doing so deliberately. Security updates only help if they are installed. We do not want to wait, because behind every building are people who rely on us. Source on the exploitation of vulnerabilities: [VulnCheck State of Exploitation 2026]

HPE ArubaOS: Eight Max-Severity Flaws Patched, Including Pre-Auth RCE and PAPI Authentication Bypass 1. Basic Information - Article Name: HPESBNW05162 rev.1 - Multiple Vulnerabilities in HPE Networking Wireless Operating Systems (AOS-10 & AOS-8) - Publisher: HPE Product Security Response Team - Publication Date: 2026-10-22 - Original Source: HPE Product Security Response Team - Related Sources: HPE Signed Advisory Text, HPE CNA: CVE-2026-79844, BleepingComputer, HPE CNA: CVE-2026-79846, HPE CNA: CVE-2026-79847, HPE CNA: CVE-2026-79848, HPE CNA: CVE-2026-79849, HPE CNA: CVE-2026-79850, HPE CNA: CVE-2026-79851, CVE-2026-79845 Official Record (Discrepancy with HPE Bulletin) - Related Malware: Unspecified - Related Threat Groups: Unspecified - Related CVEs: CVE-2026-79844, CVE-2026-79845, CVE-2026-79846, CVE-2026-79847, CVE-2026-79848, CVE-2026-79849, CVE-2026-79850, CVE-2026-79851 - Related Products: HPE Aruba Networking AOS-8, HPE Aruba Networking AOS-10, Mobility Conductors, Mobility Controllers, Mobility Gateways, Access Points - Severity: Critical - Severity Rationale: Mobility Conductors, Controllers, Central-managed Gateways, AOS-10 APs, and AOS-8 Instant APs are affected. Eight max-severity flaws involve network vectors requiring no authentication and no user interaction. CVE-2026-79844 and CVE-2026-79846 have additional prerequisites outside the attacker's control, and CVE-2026-79845 involves an authentication bypass; HPE does not describe RCE for this CVE. 2. Executive Summary HPE has released updates addressing 72 CVEs in AOS-8 and AOS-10, rating eight of them (CVE-2026-79844 through CVE-2026-79851) with a CVSS v3.1 score of 10.0. CVE-2026-79845 involves a PAPI authentication bypass leading to administrator access, configuration changes, and access to or manipulation of sensitive information, with an impact distinct from command and code execution in the other seven flaws. 3. Attack Flow The following table outlines alternative attack paths per CVE. This is not a sequential multi-step attack chain, and authentication bypass descriptions do not imply successful RCE. | Target / CVE | Flaw Description and Impact per HPE | Prerequisites and Caveats | | --- | --- | --- | | AOS-10: 79844 | Authentication bypass leading to arbitrary command execution | Requires additional prerequisites outside the attacker's control; specific details are not publicly disclosed. | | AOS-10: 79847 / 79851 | Buffer overflow leading to arbitrary code execution with privileged user rights | Requires applicable device models, versions, and network reachability for each CVE. | | AOS-8: 79846 / 79848 / 79849 | Command or SQL injection leading to arbitrary command execution | CVE-2026-79846 requires additional prerequisites outside the attacker's control. | | AOS-8: 79850 | Authentication bypass leading to arbitrary command execution with root privileges | Requires applicable device models, versions, and network reachability for each CVE. | | AOS-10 PAPI: 79845 | Authentication bypass leading to administrator access, configuration changes, and access to or manipulation of sensitive data | HPE does not describe this item as RCE. Discrepancies with public CVE records are noted in Section 14. | AOS-10 Independent Vectors (CVE-2026-79844 / 79847 / 79851) 1. CVE-2026-79844 involves an authentication bypass, while CVE-2026-79847 and CVE-2026-79851 involve buffer overflows exploitable via crafted packets or similar inputs. These are separate paths rather than a single interconnected chain. 2. Exploitation requires network reachability to the target interface. CVE-2026-79844 leads to arbitrary command execution when additional prerequisites outside the attacker's control are met, though specific details are currently undisclosed. 3. If successfully exploited, CVE-2026-79847 and CVE-2026-79851 can allow attackers to execute arbitrary code with privileged user rights on the underlying operating system. AOS-8 Independent Vectors (CVE-2026-79846 / 79848 / 79849 / 79850) 1. CVE-2026-79846 is a command injection flaw, CVE-2026-79848 and CVE-2026-79849 are SQL injection flaws, and CVE-2026-79850 is an authentication bypass. These are distinct flaws and do not represent a sequential attack chain that must be exploited in order. 2. CVE-2026-79846 has additional prerequisites outside the attacker's control. CVE-2026-79848 and CVE-2026-79849 can lead to arbitrary command execution, while CVE-2026-79850 can lead to arbitrary command execution with root privileges. AOS-10 PAPI Authentication Bypass (CVE-2026-79845) 1. The HPE bulletin describes this as a vulnerability allowing unauthenticated remote attackers to bypass PAPI authentication controls. 2. Successful exploitation can lead to administrator access, system configuration changes, and the retrieval or manipulation of sensitive information. HPE does not describe RCE for this CVE, so neither a chain with other code-execution CVEs nor successful code execution should be inferred from this description. 4. Attacker Position and Execution Location - An unauthenticated attacker with network reachability to the relevant management/control interfaces or PAPI service. CVE-2026-79844 and CVE-2026-79846 require additional prerequisites outside the attacker's control. 5. Victim and Administrator Observations Victims - Wireless LAN users may experience unstable connections or service disruptions. Administrators and SOCs - May observe suspicious connections to management interfaces, unauthorized configuration changes, process anomalies, or device reboots. 6. Conditions for Success and Failure Success Conditions - An affected AOS series and version must be running, and the attacker must be able to reach the target interface. Conditions for AOS-8 and AOS-10 should not be conflated. - Affected products include Mobility Conductors, Controllers, Central-managed Gateways, AOS-10 APs, and AOS-8 Instant APs. HPE notes that compatible hardware and VMs running affected versions are also impacted, and the provided list of models is not exhaustive. Review specific details and exceptions for each CVE. - CVE-2026-79844 and CVE-2026-79846 require additional prerequisites outside the attacker's control to be met. The original text does not specify these conditions, and network reachability alone does not guarantee successful exploitation. - The upper limits of affected active series are AOS-10 10.8.1.1 / 10.7.2.6 / 10.4.1.13 and AOS-8 8.13.3.0 / 8.10.0.23. End-of-Maintenance (EoM) and End-of-Support (EoS) releases should not be assumed safe. Failure Conditions and Mitigations - Update to AOS-10 10.8.1.2 / 10.7.2.7 / 10.4.1.14 or AOS-8 8.13.3.1 / 8.10.0.24 and later according to HPE's patch table. Verify hardware compatibility and model-specific upgrade paths. - HPE presumes End-of-Maintenance (EoM) versions are affected unless explicitly noted otherwise. End-of-Support (EoS) versions have not been evaluated for exposure and should be treated as potentially affected, and organizations are advised to migrate to supported versions. - Restrict management CLI and Web interfaces using dedicated Layer 2 segments/VLANs or Layer 3+ firewalls, and track operations using accounting. Note that accounting itself is not a blocking control. - Inference: Management interface segmentation reduces exposure pending updates, but does not replace patching for individual CVEs. 7. What Happens Upon Success - For CVE-2026-79844 and CVE-2026-79846 through CVE-2026-79851, attackers may execute arbitrary commands or code on the device. CVE-2026-79850 specifically notes execution with root privileges. - For CVE-2026-79845, the PAPI authentication bypass can lead to administrator access, configuration changes, and the retrieval or manipulation of sensitive information. The original text does not describe RCE for this CVE. - Inference: Acquired privileges or code execution could lead to configuration/traffic tampering, information disclosure, or service impact. This does not mean post-compromise activity was observed in practice. 8. Observable Logs Inference: The following are candidates for internal investigation. Data availability varies by product, configuration, permission settings, and retention periods, and should be distinguished from logs observed in the source material. A single indicator alone does not confirm successful compromise. - Email: No relevant information - Proxy / SWG / DNS: Pre-authentication anomalous requests to the management Web UI, SQL injection attempts, or malformed inputs. - Endpoint / EDR: Appliance process crashes, core dumps, or unexpected commands. - Identity / IdP: Configuration changes without corresponding authentication records, or unexpected management sessions. - SaaS / Cloud: Configuration or firmware change history in platforms such as HPE Aruba Central. - Network: Inference: Correlate unexpected traffic originating outside management networks with requests and administrative actions suspected of involving PAPI authentication bypass. Do not identify CVEs based solely on port numbers; verify port usage and log collection capabilities based on target device configurations. 9. Assessing Attack Success Confirmed in Public Information HPE describes potential pre-authentication code execution for CVE-2026-79844 and CVE-2026-79846 through CVE-2026-79851. For CVE-2026-79845, it describes PAPI authentication bypass leading to administrator access and access to or manipulation of information. HPE stated that it was not aware of public discussion or exploit code at publication. This does not establish that compromise or active exploitation had not occurred. Internal Assessment Criteria - Attack Attempt Observed (Success Unconfirmed) (contact_only): Criteria: Suspicious requests aimed at the target service are identified. Network reachability or the presence of vulnerable configurations alone does not confirm successful authentication bypass or code execution. - Initial Execution Confirmed (initial_execution): Criteria: For CVE-2026-79844 and CVE-2026-79846 through CVE-2026-79851, suspicious requests are correlated with multiple records confirming arbitrary command or code execution on the device. Crashes or configuration changes alone are insufficient. - Malware Execution or Authentication Success Confirmed (malware_or_authentication_success): Criteria: For CVE-2026-79845, requests, authentication results, sessions, or administrative action logs are linked to confirm unauthorized administrator access or authentication bypass. Arbitrary code execution is not a mandatory condition for this classification. - Follow-on Compromise Confirmed (follow_on_compromise): Criteria: Evidence of subsequent activities such as unauthorized configuration changes, information access, credential abuse, or persistence is confirmed independently of initial privilege acquisition or code execution. 10. Investigation Playbook - Trigger: Detection of vulnerable versions / suspicious connections to management interfaces / unexpected configuration changes or reboots. - Initial Checks: Verify the AOS series and version, device model, management methods, and reachable interfaces. Preserve configurations and management logs from before and after the update. - Endpoint: Check process trees, file modifications, crashes, and persistence mechanisms. - Identity / Cloud: Review the usage history of credentials, API keys, and service accounts held or used by the target system. - Follow-On: Check for network route modifications, internal reconnaissance, and communications with unknown destinations. - Containment: Update to patched versions and segment management interfaces. Isolate devices suspected of compromise and rotate credentials. - Classification: Distinguish between "reach/attempt only," "initial execution or authentication success," "information access," and "follow-on compromise." Do not assume internal compromise based solely on research demonstrations or public PoCs. 11. Defense and Detection Ideas - Single Event: Anomalous requests to management interfaces or PAPI services from unauthenticated sources / configuration changes without authentication records. - Time Series: Correlate anomalous requests -> process anomalies or configuration changes -> communications with unknown destinations. - Hunting: Retrospectively review management Web, CLI, PAPI, and configuration change histories for the pre-update period. - Logging Gaps: Use external syslog and network telemetry to preserve evidence that may be lost when appliance logs are overwritten. - Priority Controls: Firmware updates / Management interface segmentation / External syslog and accounting. 12. Facts / Inference / Hypothesis Facts - The HPE bulletin lists 72 CVEs and rates eight flaws (CVE-2026-79844 through CVE-2026-79851) with a CVSS v3.1 score of 10.0. The impact of authentication bypass and code execution varies by CVE. - CVE-2026-79845 is described as an authentication bypass in the AOS-10 PAPI service leading to administrator access, configuration changes, and access to or manipulation of sensitive information, with no mention of RCE. - Patched versions include AOS-10 10.8.1.2 / 10.7.2.7 / 10.4.1.14 and AOS-8 8.13.3.1 / 8.10.0.24 and later. End-of-Maintenance (EoM) and End-of-Support (EoS) series require separate migration decisions. - HPE stated at the time of publication that it was not aware of public discussions or exploit code regarding these vulnerabilities. This statement does not guarantee the absence of active exploitation. Inference - Management interface segmentation serves as an exposure reduction measure pending updates, but does not replace patching. Hypothesis No additional hypotheses. Unconfirmed items are noted under "Unknowns and Additional Investigation." 13. MITRE ATT&CK Mapping | ID | Technique | Confidence | Basis | | --- | --- | --- | --- | | T1190 | Exploit Public-Facing Application | medium | Assumes exploitation of vulnerabilities in management and control interfaces over the network. Active exploitation is unconfirmed. | 14. Unknowns and Additional Investigation - The original text does not specify the exact nature of the additional prerequisites outside the attacker's control required for CVE-2026-79844 and CVE-2026-79846. - The official CVE record for CVE-2026-79845 contains descriptions of a different product, leaving a discrepancy with the HPE bulletin. ArubaOS target scope, impact, and update decisions in this article follow HPE's own descriptions. It remains unclear which registry entry or description will be corrected. - Specific request formats, actual victim counts, and post-compromise behaviors for each CVE are not established by the reviewed materials. 15. Impact on SOCs and Organizations Organizations operating Aruba infrastructure should audit their deployed AOS series, versions, and management interface reachability, and apply patched versions. 16. Key Takeaways by Role - SOC: Monitor for pre-authentication access to management interfaces, PAPI anomalies, configuration changes, reboots, and suspicious outbound communications. - Administrators: Apply patched versions and restrict CLI and Web management interfaces to trusted hosts using dedicated VLANs or firewalls. - General Users: End users cannot fix this directly. Follow administrator instructions for updates and segmentation.

Signal RingRTC CVE-2026-113380: Queue Saturation Can Keep Audio and Possibly Video Active After Hang-Up 1. Basic Information - Article Title: CVE-2026-113380 (MITRE CNA Record) - Publisher: MITRE (CVE CNA) - Publication Date: 2026-10-20 - Original Source: CVE-2026-113380 (MITRE CNA Record) - Related Information Sources: NVD: CVE-2026-113380, RingRTC fix commit, SecurityWeek: Signal Vulnerability Lets Malicious Callers Block Hang-Ups, Researcher's Technical Analysis and Synthetic Queue Demo - Related Malware and Threat Groups: Unspecified - Related CVE: CVE-2026-113380 - Related Products: Signal RingRTC, Signal - Severity: High - Severity Basis: A CVSS 9.3 vulnerability that can be triggered remotely by a call partner, leading to a severe privacy breach (active exploitation has not been confirmed, and it has been fixed in RingRTC 2.72.0). 2. Executive Summary A vulnerability in Signal's calling library, RingRTC, can disrupt hang-up processing if a call peer saturates the finite-state machine (FSM) event queue. Audio and, under some conditions, video capture and transmission may then continue after the user attempts to hang up. Note that the published proof-of-concept (PoC) code is a synthetic queue simulation in an offline environment and does not demonstrate successful attacks against live Signal calls on a real network. 3. Attack Flow The attack path is based on the CVE record and fix commit (the PoC published by the researcher is a synthetic model that does not include network traffic or live calls, and must be clearly distinguished from the validation of exploit procedures in a real environment). Attack Path Indicated by CVE Description 1. An attacker establishes an active call with the target and sends a large volume of peer-derived events to the vulnerable RingRTC call event processing mechanism. 2. Saturating the FSM event queue prevents hang-up processing locally on the victim's device from successfully completing the release of the call session and media tracks. 3. Even after the user perceives the call as ended on the screen, the transmission of the audio track (and potentially the video track) continues (this is the technical impact of the published flaw, not an indication of actual damage in a real attack). The table summarizes the public information above. Defender signals are suggestions for investigation in your own environment (Inference). Undisclosed implementation details and follow-on behavior are left unspecified. | Attack Stage | Attacker Action / Technique | Tools / Communication Used | Defender Signals (Conditions / Artifacts) | | --- | --- | --- | --- | | 1. Call Establishment | Establishes a Signal call session with the target | Signal call (E2EE WebRTC communication) | Normal Signal call start logs and incoming call records | | 2. Queue Saturation | Continuously sends a large volume of peer-derived events to saturate the RingRTC FSM queue | Specific network message format undisclosed | Device-side event records when available (the published model is not a reproduction of a live call) | | 3. Hang-Up Disruption | The victim's local hang-up event stalls and processing is blocked within the queue | Interference with normal hang-up operations | Media sessions remain active even after the victim's disconnect action | | 4. Impact (Potential) | Audio and potentially video may continue even after hang-up | Potential continuation of media communication | OS displays and encrypted traffic flows alone do not confirm content transmission or delivery to the peer | 4. Attacker Position and Execution Location - A remote call peer who has established an active call with the victim. 5. Victim and Administrator Perspective Victims - Even though the call appears to have been disconnected by pressing the end call button on the UI, an in-call indicator (such as an active microphone or camera light) may remain in the OS status bar, and audio may continue to reach the other party. Administrators and SOCs - May be observed as active device privacy indicators, application log inconsistencies, lingering media sessions, or continued network traffic past the disconnection timestamp. 6. Success and Failure Conditions Success Conditions - A Signal client incorporating RingRTC prior to version 2.72.0 is running. - The attacker is able to establish a call with the victim and saturate the FSM queue. Failure Conditions and Mitigations - Immediately update the Signal app to the latest version containing the patched RingRTC. - Verify that the OS microphone and camera usage indicators (icons) turn off after ending a call, and if they do not disappear, completely force-close the application. 7. What Happens Upon Success - Unauthorized capture or eavesdropping on surrounding audio after the user attempts to hang up. - Unintended continuation of video track transmission under specific conditions. - Severe privacy breach and leakage of confidential information. 8. Observable Logs Inference: The following are candidates for internal investigation. Availability depends on the product, privileges, settings, and retention periods, and should be distinguished from observation records in source materials. Single events alone do not confirm attribution or successful compromise in this case. Email - This issue requires an established call, and email delivery vectors have not been publicized. Proxy / SWG / DNS - Internal call FSM events or hang-up processing cannot be directly read from proxy or DNS logs. Correlate available destination IPs and session durations with device records. Endpoint / EDR - Review available Signal app logs, OS microphone and camera access display histories, and correlate hang-up times with media session states (this issue involves a call processing flaw; OS shell execution or file generation are not inherent required indicators). Identity / IdP - Verification of accounts and linked devices is performed to isolate alternative factors, but administrative privileges or authentication compromise are not required for the issue itself to manifest. SaaS / Cloud - Check application versions and deployment histories collectible via MDM or management tools (Signal's E2EE communication contents and detailed FSM logs are not retained in cloud audit logs). Network - Correlate the duration of media communication traffic continuing past the hang-up operation time with device-side records (due to encrypted communications, packet contents alone cannot reconstruct audio or video contents). 9. Attack Success Determination Confirmed in Public Information The CVE record and RingRTC fix commit substantiate the existence of a flaw that impedes hang-up processing. The fix commit includes unit tests in a synthetic environment. The researcher's PoC is also an offline queue model and is distinct from confirmation of successful exploitation or actual damage in live calls. Internal Determination Criteria - User Operation Confirmed: The stage where call establishment and the user's hang-up operation are confirmed via device logs or similar means. Operation records alone cannot determine the success or failure of communication termination. - Information Theft or Session Compromise Confirmed: When factual evidence substantiates that audio or video continued to reach the peer as encrypted communication even after the hang-up operation (lingering OS displays or ongoing encrypted traffic flows alone do not confirm the transmission or delivery of audio/video contents). 10. Investigation Playbook - Trigger: Initiated by microphone indicators remaining lit after call termination, sessions with abnormally long durations, or suspicious ongoing traffic. - Initial Review: Check the Signal app version, included RingRTC version, call partner, hang-up operation time, and OS privacy indicator display state. - Endpoint / Server Investigation: Preserve Signal app logs, crash logs, OS media permission logs, and screen captures. - Identity / Cloud Investigation: Check the list of registered devices on the account and rule out suspicious linked devices or account takeover possibilities. - Subsequent Actions: Investigate call duration, outgoing data volume, and follow-up communications from the peer. - Containment: Force-close the application, update to the latest version, and temporarily disconnect the device from the network if necessary. - Judgment Classification: Clearly distinguish contact, execution, successful authentication, information retrieval, and subsequent compromise stages, and do not assume unverified success. 11. Defense and Detection Ideas - Single Events: Detect persistent lighting of media indicators after hang-up operations or abnormally long call sessions. - Temporal Correlation: Correlate the flow of a sudden surge in peer events -> hang-up operation -> remaining media sessions -> ongoing encrypted traffic. - Threat Hunting: Comprehensively search managed devices for Signal versions, abnormally long call records, and post-call traffic. - Log Limitations: Due to E2EE communication, network equipment cannot inspect payloads, and mobile OS telemetry regarding application internals is limited. - Priority Mitigations: Promptly update the Signal app, verify compliance with managed device versions, educate users on checking privacy indicators, and establish reporting procedures for anomalies. 12. Facts / Inference / Hypothesis Facts - CVE-2026-113380 affects RingRTC prior to version 2.72.0 and has a severity score of CVSS v4.0 9.3. - The CVE record indicates that saturation of the FSM event queue by a call partner prevents local hang-up processing from completing, potentially causing audio or, in some cases, video to continue. - The fix commit is dated September 4, 2026, and introduces processing to evaluate termination requests independently of the queue, continuing media resource release even upon notification failure, alongside unit tests. - The PoC published by the researcher is an offline synthetic queue simulation and does not demonstrate successful exploitation in actual Signal calls. Additionally, referenced materials show no observations of active exploitation. Inference - Because there is a divergence between operation completion on the device screen and the actual cessation of media tracks, safety cannot be judged based solely on UI displays. Hypothesis No additional hypotheses. Unverified items are listed in "Unknowns and Additional Investigation." 13. MITRE ATT&CK Mapping The following are candidates based on the potential impact in desktop environments, and do not imply uniform applicability to mobile environments or confirmation of active exploitation. | ID | Technique | Confidence | Basis | | --- | --- | --- | --- | | T1123 | Audio Capture | medium | Candidate based on the impact when the audio track continues to be transmitted even after the hang-up operation (recording operations by the attacker and active exploitation are unconfirmed). | | T1125 | Video Capture | low | Candidate based on the CVE description that video tracks may also continue (specific success conditions and successful recording are unconfirmed). | 14. Unknowns and Additional Investigation - The exact versions and dates when the patched RingRTC was incorporated into official releases of Signal clients for each OS (iOS, Android, Desktop). - Presence of active exploitation, stable detection signatures, and specific conditions for video continuation. 15. Impact on SOCs and Organizations Organizations utilizing Signal for business communications or sensitive calls should immediately verify app versions on managed devices, update them to the latest version, and investigate device and network logs if anomalies are reported where OS microphone or camera indicators persist after call termination. 16. Audience-Specific Summary - For SOCs: Monitor and correlate ongoing media sessions after call termination operations, suspiciously long WebRTC traffic, and persistent OS privacy indicator lighting. - For Administrators: Immediately update the Signal app to the latest version and verify that no outdated builds (RingRTC prior to 2.72.0) remain across managed devices. - For Users: Update the Signal app to the latest version, and if microphone or camera icons on the screen do not disappear after ending a call, force-close the application and notify your administrator.

CVE公開数を深刻度別に直近3年でグラフ化してもらったら昨今のお祭りが一目瞭然ですね。 
2024〜2025年はほぼ横ばいでしたが、2026年に入って急増しています。
2026/01→09で High は約3.8倍(1,609→6,160件)、Critical は約3.7倍(416→1,555件)。
出典: CVEProject/cvelistv5 t.co

BIRD IPv6 FlowSpec: nonzero destination-prefix offsets can bypass route validation for an established BGP peer with a suitable unicast route, risking unauthorized downstream filtering. CVE-2026-112112: apply the cited patch or a verified backport. github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/blob/main/cves/20…

Langflow CVE-2026-105740: RCE via Authenticated MCP Stdio, 2,023 Exploitation Attempts Observed 1. Basic Information - Article Name: CVE-2026-105740 Exploitation Observed — langflow - Source: Previdian - Published Date: 2026-10-05 - Updated Date: 2026-10-17 - Original: Previdian - Related Sources: Langflow Security Advisory GHSA-7w94-79vh-5mr2, SecurityWeek roundup: Langflow exploitation, CVE CNA record: CVE-2026-105740 - Related Malware: None - Related Threat Groups: None - Related CVE: CVE-2026-105740 - Related Products: Langflow before 1.9.0, MCP Stdio transport - Severity: Critical This is a severe vulnerability with a CVSS score of 9.9, allowing low-privileged accounts to achieve code execution on the server. Although observed by a single sensor, continuous exploitation attempts have been recorded from 28 source IPs across 16 countries, including Japan. 2. Quick Summary In Langflow before 1.9.0, authenticated low-privileged users can save MCP Stdio commands, which execute arbitrary commands with the privileges of the Langflow process when a list retrieval request with action_count=true is called. Previdian observed 2,023 exploitation attempts starting September 19, 2026, as of the October 17 verification. 3. Attack Flow Path 1: RCE via MCP Stdio from Low-Privileged Account 1. The attacker authenticates using a low-privileged Langflow account. 2. They add an MCP server using the Stdio transport method, configuring and saving the execution command and optional environment variables (env). 3. When GET /api/v2/mcp/servers?action_count=true retrieves the list with action counts, Langflow passes the saved command without validation to a bash -c process execution. Note that not all standard list retrievals without query parameters trigger execution. 4. Arbitrary OS commands run with the execution privileges of the Langflow process, leading to the retrieval of additional payloads or the discovery of secrets within the environment. 4. Attacker Position and Execution Location - A low-privileged remote user who can log into Langflow. In environments accessible from the internet, leaked credentials or improperly created accounts serve as an initial foothold. 5. Victim and Administrator Perspective - Victim / User: Because it appears as normal workflow editing or MCP server addition, regular user screens may not display clear warnings. - Administrator: Can be observed as the registration of MCP Stdio settings, a bash process starting immediately after a list retrieval with action_count=true, modification of environment variables, and outbound communication to unknown destinations. 6. Success and Failure Conditions Success Conditions - Ability to authenticate with a valid account against Langflow versions prior to 1.9.0. - Low-privileged users must be able to save MCP Stdio settings and trigger the launch of a bash child process on the Langflow server. Execution is triggered by list retrieval with action_count=true. Failure Conditions and Mitigations - Update Langflow to 1.9.0 or later and restrict the use of MCP Stdio to essential administrators only. - Reduce unnecessary internet exposure, shared accounts, and long-lived API keys, and run the Langflow process itself in a low-privileged, sandboxed environment. 7. What Happens Upon Success - Execution of arbitrary OS commands on the Langflow server. - Potential unauthorized access to connected connector credentials, AI model API keys, workflow data, or subsequent discovery within the same network. 8. Observable Logs Below are potential investigation targets within your organization. Availability depends on products, permissions, log settings, and retention periods; the absence of records does not prove the absence of a breach. - Email: No email vectors specific to this issue have been identified. - Proxy / SWG / DNS: Distinguish and check POST requests adding MCP Stdio settings from GET /api/v2/mcp/servers?action_count=true requests, and investigate subsequent child processes or outbound communications. Note that attacks do not necessarily generate external callback traffic. - Endpoint / EDR: Check records of bash, sh, curl, wget, or similar tools launched from Langflow or Python processes, as well as changes to environment variables such as LD_PRELOAD or PATH. - Identity / IdP: Check for the creation of new low-privileged accounts, logins from unknown sources, and API key usage history. - SaaS / Cloud: Check change histories for workflows, MCP servers, connectors, and secrets, along with usage statuses of connected AI models and cloud API keys. - Network: Check the Langflow host for DNS queries to unknown destinations, HTTP traffic, reverse shells, or other communications. 9. Attack Success Determination Confirmed in Public Information - Exploitation attempts observed (success unconfirmed): Public information: Previdian's honeypot sensor observed 2,023 exploitation attempts. The success or failure of command execution and subsequent compromises in production organizations cannot be confirmed solely through this telemetry. Scope: Observations from a single sensor between September 19 and October 17, 2026. Separate contact, execution, persistence, data access, and exfiltration; do not infer unconfirmed success from a single alert. 10. Investigation Playbook - Investigation Starting Point: Start with deployments of Langflow before 1.9.0, suspicious MCP Stdio configuration saves, or bash execution by the Langflow process. - Initial Verification: Check the running version, scope of internet exposure, used accounts, contents of saved MCP server command and env settings, and the execution time and user of list retrievals with action_count=true. The user who saved the setting and the user who triggered the list retrieval may not be the same. - Device and Server Investigation: Preserve the process tree, shell history, environment variables, downloaded files, temporary directories, and container-host boundary settings. - Authentication and Cloud Investigation: Check Langflow accounts, API keys, connector credentials, and usage history of tokens for model providers. - Subsequent Actions: Track secret discovery, additional payload deployment, internal network scanning, unauthorized cloud API usage, and data exfiltration. - Containment: Isolate the target service from the network, update to 1.9.0 or later, revoke suspicious accounts and API keys, and remove unauthorized MCP Stdio settings. - Determination Categories: Evaluate scan traffic, logins, MCP setting saves, command execution, secret access, and external communication in separate stages. 11. Defense and Detection Ideas - Single Event: Detect events where bash -c or download utilities are launched from Langflow or Python processes with high priority. - Time-Series Correlation: Correlate logins using low-privileged accounts, saving MCP Stdio settings, list retrievals with action_count=true, bash execution, and outbound traffic in chronological order. - Threat Hunting: Search all internal Langflow environments for versions, internet exposure status, MCP Stdio configurations, shared accounts, and suspicious child processes on hosts. - Log Limitations: Because Previdian's public telemetry lacks details on requested paths, User-Agents, and callback host details, internal application logs and EDR logs must be cross-referenced. - Priority Mitigations: Prioritize updating to version 1.9.0, restricting permissions for the MCP Stdio feature, sandboxing the host side, and rotating saved credentials. 12. Facts / Inference / Hypothesis Facts - In Langflow before 1.9.0, MCP Stdio command values saved by authenticated users are passed directly to bash -c execution without prior validation, allowlists, or sandboxing when list retrieval with action_count=true occurs. - Saved command values are executed via list retrieval specifying action_count=true, and this request is also called when viewing MCP settings in the management console. Because settings are persisted, they re-execute whenever list retrieval matching these conditions occurs. Environment variable injection such as LD_PRELOAD or PATH via the env field is also possible. - Previdian observed initial exploitation attempts on September 19, 2026, recording a cumulative total of 2,023 attempts, 28 source IP addresses, and 16 countries as of the October 17 verification. - This observation is based on a single honeypot sensor. Although source countries include Japan, this does not mean organizations within Japan suffered damage. - CVE-2026-105740 is registered with a CVSS v3.1 score of 9.9 as CWE-78, and was patched in Langflow 1.9.0. Previdian's public page noted it as not listed on CISA KEV as of October 17. - The CVE CNA record defines affected versions as prior to 1.9.0. Additionally, the GitHub advisory package field lists 1.8.3, and the fixed version field lists 1.9.0. Inference - Because publicly available exploitation observations are records of attempts against a single honeypot, the arrival of attack requests and successful compromises in production organizations must be evaluated separately. Combining monitoring for leaked or improperly created low-privileged accounts with audits of MCP setting changes improves the accuracy of detecting actual harm. Hypothesis No additional hypotheses. Unconfirmed items are noted in "Unknowns and Additional Investigation". 13. MITRE ATT&CK Mapping | ID | Technique | Confidence | Basis | | --- | --- | --- | --- | | T1059.004 | Command and Scripting Interpreter: Unix Shell | high | Commands configured in MCP Stdio are executed on the server via bash -c. Source | | T1078 | Valid Accounts | medium | Exploitation requires an authenticated low-privileged Langflow account. Source | 14. Unknowns and Additional Investigation - Specific payload contents observed by Previdian, callback destinations, attacker objectives, the number of successful compromises in production organizations, and the breakdown of duplication or automated scanning within the 2,023 attempts cannot be confirmed from public information. 15. Impact on SOCs and Organizations Because AI workflow platforms connect closely with credentials for external services and internal data connectors, the impact of remote code execution (RCE) on servers extends beyond the Langflow host alone. Organizations running Langflow should prioritize reviewing internet exposure, promptly updating to version 1.9.0 or later, auditing permissions for low-privileged accounts and API keys, and correlating MCP Stdio settings with host-level child process creation logs. 16. Summary by Target Audience - For SOCs: Correlate MCP Stdio configuration saves, list retrievals with action_count=true, bash execution by Langflow, environment variable injection, and outbound traffic over time. Include cases in which a different user triggers list retrieval after the settings were saved. - For Administrators: Update Langflow to 1.9.0 or later, restrict unnecessary internet exposure and MCP Stdio features, and inventory registered accounts and API keys. - For Users: Do not reuse credentials for management consoles or shared accounts, and promptly report any unfamiliar MCP server settings to administrators if found.

@LManzaS @5eniorDeveloper Depende, todo está en el front-end. Desde forgería XSS hasta CVEs, en el FBI tenemos un repo público. Si quieres pegarle una pentest al front-end de tu sitio, una vez ganado el acceso al middleware, hay otras formas de ganar accesos a los túneles. CVEProject/cvelistV5